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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford'
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
the period of June 1, 2009 through May 31, 2010 that pertain to Georgia
fiduciary law and estate planning.'
I.

GEORGIA CASES

Children Born Out of Wedlock
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) contains a statute
that deals extensively with the rights of a child who is born out of
wedlock to inherit from the child's putative father.2 Under this statute,
one way in which a child may prove that the decedent was the child's
father is by establishing a 97% probability of paternity through genetic
testing.? These test results raise a rebuttable presumption of paternity,
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* Catherine C. Henson Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Visiting Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law; University of Georgia; Emory University;
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College of Trust and Estate Counsel. Author, MARY F. RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS AND
CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005); MARY RADFORD, REDFEARN: WIILS AND
ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (7th ed. 2008). The author wishes to thank Deana Spencer
for her research assistance.
1. For analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REV. 385 (2009).
2. See O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3 (1997). For an in-depth discussion of the inheritance rights
of children born out of wedlock, see MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 9.5 (7th ed. 2008).
3. O.C.GA § 53-2-3(2)(BXii). The statute indicates that "Iplarentage-determination
genetic testing... includels] but [is] not... limited tol] red cell antigen, human leucocyte
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which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence by those
who claim there is no parent-child relationship."
The question addressed in In re Estate of Warren' was whether
genetic testing could be performed by using genetic material of the
father's relatives or only by using the father's own genetic material.'
In that case, Doris Mattison sought to prove that she was the biological
child of William Warren and was therefore an heir to his estate.
Mattison produced evidence from testing performed on DNA samples of
herself, her biological mother, and the undisputed son of William
Warren. The samples established a 99.65% probability that she and
Warren's son were half-siblings, and because there was absolutely no
evidence of any relationship between her mother and Warren's son, the
samples also established a 99.65% probability that William Warren was
her father. Warren's son argued that the DNA samples had to be direct
comparisons of the DNA of the putative father and the child, rather than
of the child and parties related to the putative father.' The trial court
found, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the statute contains no
such requirement.' Thus, the DNA testing created the rebuttable
presumption required by the statute.9 This holding is a welcomed one
because it clarifies that a child who is trying to prove paternity need not
produce genetic material of the putative father. Importantly, the
acquisition of such material from a decedent may be impossible if the
decedent was cremated, or it may necessitate the exhumation of the
decedent's body.o
The rights of children born out of wedlock to take under the parent's
will are somewhat more murky because such rights are more focused on
the testator's intent than on statutory law. In Hood v. Todd," the
Georgia Supreme Court examined a will in which the testator left his
estate to his children, whom he defined "as 'only the lawful blood

antigen (HLA), red cell enzyme, and serum protein electrophoresis tests or testing by
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) probes." Id.
4. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2XBXii)-(C).
5. 300 Ga. App. 408, 685 S.E.2d 411 (2009).
6. Id. at 410-11, 685 S.E.2d at 413.
7. Id. at 409-11, 685 S.E.2d at 412-13.
8. Id. at 410-11, 685 S.E.2d at 413.
9. Id. at 411, 685 S.E.2d at 413.
10. As noted by the court, O.C.G.A. § 53-2-27 (1997 & Supp. 2009) allows the court in
limited circumstances to order the disinterment of the remains of a decedent in order to
acquire genetic material, see In re Estate of Warren, 300 Ga. App. at 411, 685 S.E.2d at
413, but this process is certainly not one that a court would order lightly, particularly if
there are other means of proving paternity.
11. 287 Ga. 164, 695 S.E.2d 31 (2010).
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descendants in the first degree of the parent designated.'"" The
supreme court determined that it was the testator's intent to exclude
from this class his biological child who had been born out of wedlock."
B.

Will Revocation
The O.C.GA. allows a testator to revoke his or her will at any time
prior to death.' One of the ways in which revocation may be accomplished is by any destruction or obliteration of the will that is performed
with the intent to revoke the will." If the will is not completely
destroyed or obliterated, the intent to revoke the will is presumed if a
material portion" of the will is destroyed or obliterated." Unlike
some states,'8 Georgia does not allow a will to be revoked in part by a
revoking act."e Thus, if a material portion of the will is destroyed or
obliterated, the presumption arises that the testator intended to revoke
the entire will.o For the will to be admitted to probate, the propounder
of the will must overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence.'
The Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision in Peterson v. Harrell'
causes some confusion about the correct way to analyze whether the
revocation of a material portion of the will revokes the will in its
entirety. The testator, Marion E. Peterson, was survived by her two
siblings (her closest relatives) and her long-time companion, Vasta
Lucas. The testator's will established a trust, the benefits of which
would accrue to Lucas during her life and at her death to four remainder
beneficiaries, two of whom were Peterson's siblings. When the will was
offered for probate, it exhibited some markings that raised the question
of whether the will had been revoked. The testator had used ink to
strike through the names of all the remainder beneficiaries as well as
12. Id. at 165, 695 S.E.2d at 32.
13. Id. at 166, 695 S.E.2d at 33.
14. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-40 (1997).
15. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-44 (1997 & Supp. 2009). See RADFORD, supranote 2, at § 5.15 for
a discussion of revocation by destruction or obliteration.
16. The question of whether the portion that was destroyed is "material" is a question
of law. Lovell v. Anderson, 272 Ga. 675, 676, 533 S.E.2d 64, 65-66 (2000).
17. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-44.
18. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(aX2) (1990) (permitting a testator to revoke
a will "or any part thereof ... by performing a revocatory act" such as destroying,
canceling, tearing, or obliterating the will).
19. Price v. Hill, 184 Ga. 191, 195, 190 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1937); see Hartz v. Sobel, 136
Ga. 565, 576-79, 71 S.E. 995, 1001-02 (1911).
20. Howard v. Cotton, 223 Ga. 118, 122, 153 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1937).
21. Id.
22. 286 Ga. 546, 690 S.E.2d 151 (2010).
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the language naming her successor executor.' She had written at the
None of these
end of the will, "My executrix is Julie Peterson."'
obliterations had been witnessed, but it was undisputed that they had
been made by the testator.' The trial court held, and the supreme
court agreed, that the testator clearly had not intended to revoke the
will in its entirety but rather had only intended to revoke it in part.2 6
The supreme court concluded that because the testator had intended
only to revoke the will in part (and the caveators had offered no proof of
a different intent), the will remained completely intact and was properly
admitted to probate."
Justices Hunstein and Carley dissented in this case." They took the
position that the obliteration of the names of the successor beneficiaries
was indeed an obliteration of a material portion of the will." According
to the dissenters, this obliteration of a material portion of the will had
raised the presumption of the intent to revoke the will in its entirety."
The dissenters noted that it was then the burden of the propounders of
the will to rebut the presumption, but the propounders had offered no
rebuttal evidence.a" Thus, the presumption would prevail, the requisite
intent would be deemed to have been present, and the will would be
revoked in its entirety.32
This case presented the trial court with a very difficult dilemma: the
court clearly knew that the testator's primary intent was to benefit her
companion during her companion's life, but it faced statutory law that
would completely annihilate her intent. Had the trial court found that
the will was revoked in its entirety, the companion would have received
nothing, and the two siblings would have taken the entire estate by
intestacy. The trial court's opinion would have carried out the testator's
intent but for one unanticipated twist of fate: Vasta Lucas, the
companion, died during the pendency of the appeal.' Lucas's interest

23. Id. at 546, 690 S.E.2d at 152.
24. Id at 546-47, 690 S.E.2d at 152.
25. Id. at 546-47 & n.1, 690 S.E.2d at 152 & n.1.
26. Id. at 547, 690 S.E.2d at 153. Evidence relied upon by the supreme court included
the fact that the caveators had no independent knowledge of nor had ever had any
discussions with the testator about her intent to revoke the will; the will was found among
the testator's personal possessions and in good condition (other than the obliterations), and
the "primary bequest to Lucas ... remained intact," Id.
27. Id. at 548, 690 S.E.2d at 153.
28. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 550, 690 S.E.2d at 154.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 550, 690 S.E.2d at 155.
32. Id. at 551, 690 S.E.2d at 155.
33. Id. at 546, 690 S.E.2d at 152 (majority opinion).
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under the will was only a life interest.' Thus, the individuals who
gained from the result in this case were the two remainder beneficiaries
who were not the testator's siblings. Had the will been found to have
been revoked, they would have been cut out entirely. In fact, the
testator herself had obliterated their names along with those of the two
siblings." 'lb the degree one can discern the testator's true intent, it
appears that she did not want any of those beneficiaries to take
anything from her estate. However, under the majority opinion, all of
them became beneficiaries of the trust.'
C. ChargingExpenses of AdministrationAgainst a Beneficiary's
Share of the Estate
In Pate v. Wilson," the supreme court addressed whether a beneficiary whose malfeasance had caused the estate to incur litigation expenses
and attorney fees should have her share of the estate reduced by these
expenses." Soon after the testator died, his widow and her son from
another marriage were sued by the executor of his estate-a daughter
from his first marriage-for undue influence in connection with the
transfer of land that the testator had owned in North Carolina. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled against the widow and her son.
The testator's will was admitted to probate in Richmond County,
Georgia, which was his domicile at the date of his death.39 The will
devised a share of the testator's estate to his widow and provided further
that the share "shall not be reduced by any expenses of administration
of my estate."4 The executor sought to charge the widow's share with
the expenses of the North Carolina litigation under the theory that the
widow's wrongdoing had caused those expenses to be incurred."'
The supreme court approached this issue as a question of the testator's
intent.' The court concluded that the clause in the testator's will
regarding administrative expenses indicated that he did not want his
widow's share to be diminished by the "ordinary and usual expenses" of
administration but that the expenses at issue were not ordinary but
were rather expenses that resulted from the widow's undue influence

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
Id
See id. at 548, 690 S.E.2d at 153.
286 Ga. 133, 686 S.E.2d 88 (2009).
See id. at 133, 686 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 133-34, 686 S.E.2d at 88-89.
Id at 134, 686 S.E.2d at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id. at 134-35, 686 S.E.2d at 89-90.
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and malfeasance." On the other hand, the court went on to hold that
it did not follow logically from the court's first conclusion that the
widow's share should bear all of the expenses of the litigation."
Rather, the widow's share "must suffer the same diminution in value as
all other shares" in bearing this expense of administration." The court
pointed out in a footnote that its holding did not reach the issue of
whether the other beneficiaries had a cause of action against the widow
for her role in causing their shares to be diminished in value."
Justices Hunstein, Carley, and Thompson wrote a short dissent in which
they disagreed with the majority's conclusion that only the "ordinary
expenses" of administration were addressed in the testator's will.47 The
dissenters felt that the will clearly immunized the widow's share from
paying any expenses of administration, whether ordinary or extraordinary.48
D.

15-ust Modification
In Smith v. Hallum," the supreme court was asked to approve a
trust modification that would have resulted in eliminating distributions
to one of the trust beneficiaries." John Dewey Smith created a trust
in 1990 that was funded with a life insurance policy on the joint lives of
him and his wife, Inez. The face value of the policy was $800,000."
The undisputed purpose of the trust was to "provid[e] for his descendants when he and his wife [were] no longer living."" Smith died in
2003, and in 2004 Inez was attacked in her home, shot, and stabbed
several times. She survived the attack. One of Smith's grandsons was
the alleged assailant. When the instant case was being considered by
the supreme court, charges against the grandson were still pending, and
there was some question as to whether he was competent to stand trial.
Hallum, the trustee, petitioned the superior court to modify the trust so
that the grandson would be prohibited from receiving any distributions
from the trust.53

43. Id. at 135, 686 S.E.2d at 90.
44. Id.
46. Id. at 136, 686 S.E.2d at 90.
46. Id. at 136 n.4, 686 S.E.2d at 90 n.4.
47. Id. at 136, 686 8.E.2d at 91 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id.
49. 286 Ga. 834, 691 S.E.2d 848 (2010).
50. See id. at 834, 691 S.E.2d at 848-49.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 834-35, 691 S.E.2d at 849.
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O.C.G.A. § 53-12-153," which was the law in effect at the time this
case was decided,' allowed the court to modify an irrevocable trust "if
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that, owing to
circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor, compliance
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes
of the trust."' The trustee alleged in her petition that Smith's purpose
had clearly not been to "incentivize [sic] his grandson to attack his
grandmother to speed his receipt of [tirust benefits."" However, the
trustee offered no evidence at trial that the attacks had been motivated
by the grandson's greed rather than simply by the paranoid delusions
that resulted from his severely disturbed mental state."
The supreme court noted that the attacks were clearly unanticipated
circumstances within the meaning of the statute, as the grandson was
only seven years old when the trust was created. However, the court
pointed out that the showing of unanticipated circumstances was only
part of the proof required by the statute."0 The trustee must also show
that the application of the trust terms without modification would defeat
or substantially impair the accomplishment of the trust purposes.e'
The court assumed that the purpose of the trust was to provide for
Smith's descendants and pointed out that removing the grandson as a
trust beneficiary "actively promotes the defeat of. .. [that] purpose."62
The court also observed that the trustee had offered absolutely no
evidence that Smith's intent in creating the trust would be impaired
substantially if the modification was not allowed.' Thus, the court
reasoned that because the trustee failed to produce any such evidence,
the court had no need to speculate whether the settlor would have

54. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-153 (1997 & Supp. 2009) (repealed 2010).
55. See Part II(B) infra for a discussion of the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010;
O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12 (Supp. 2010).
56. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-153.
57. Smith, 286 Ga. at 835, 691 S.E.2d at 849 (first alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. The supreme court noted that while the petition to modify the trust was being
considered by the trial court, the grandson had not been tried because there were severe
doubts as to whether he was competent to stand trial. Id Therefore, there was no actual
proof that he had even committed the attack on his grandmother. Id. However, in its
analysis at the appellate level, the supreme court was willing to assume for the sake of
argument that there was clear and convincing evidence that the grandson had committed
the crime. Id.
59. Id. at 835, 691 S.E.2d at 849-50.
60. Id. at 836, 691 S.E.2d at 850.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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wanted the grandson to continue as a beneficiary given the current
situation." Nevertheless, the supreme court then went on to speculate
that despite the attacks, Smith might have wanted the grandson to
receive trust funds in order to afford treatment for his mental illness."
In short, the court concluded that the trustee had not carried her burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the trust purpose would
be defeated or impaired were the grandson to receive trust funds."
Justice Carley dissented, noting that if the attacks had resulted in the
death of Inez, the grandson could have been prohibited from taking trust
funds under Georgia's slayer statute, and the supreme court would
therefore have been required to modify the trust terms." Justice
Carley also noted that courts have recognized far less serious circumstances as justifying a modification, such as a change in tax law." He
pointed out that the modification requested by the trustee would not cut
out the grandson's descendants-only the grandson himself." Additionally, Justice Carley reasoned that the denial of modification would
provide the grandson "with a continuing financial incentive to hasten the
death of his grandmother."o

E. Spendthrift Tusts
A "spendthrift trust" is one in which the beneficiaries' interests are
insulated from the reach of their creditors. In 1991 Georgia adopted
an extensive spendthrift trust statute that provided, among other things,
that a settlor who is also the beneficiary of the trust could not apply the
spendthrift protections to his own interest in the trust.7 2 The spend-

64. Id.
65. Id. at 837, 691 S.E.2d at 850. The supreme court found evidence of this illness in
the criminal court's deliberations surrounding the grandson's competency to stand trial.
Id.
66. Id. The new Georgia statute dealing with court-ordered modification is similar in
wording to the statute at issue in this case, except that it does not include the requirement
of clear and convincing evidence. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-62(a)(1) (Supp. 2010). As the
trustee in this case failed to present any evidence, the case would probably have had the
same outcome had the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010 been applicable.
67. Smith, 286 Ga. at 837, 691 S.E.2d at 851 (Carley, J., dissenting). Under O.C.G.A.
§ 53-1-5 (1997), an individual who feloniously and intentionally kills another individual is
barred from taking an interest under any trust created by the decedent. Id.
68. Smith, 286 Ga. at 837-38, 691 S.E.2d at 851 (Carley, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 838, 691 S.E.2d at 851.
70. Id. at 839, 691 S.E.2d at 852.
71. BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 1654 (9th ed. 2009). See RADFORD, supra note 2, at § 14:6
for a discussion of spendthrift trusts.
72. Ga. H.R. Bill 794, Reg. Seas., 1991 Ga. Laws 810 (codified at O.C.GA § 53-12-28(c)
(1997)), repealedby Ga. S. Bill 131, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 506 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit.
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thrift trust statute in the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010"
contains a similar prohibition."
In Phillips v. Moore, the supreme court addressed whether the
interests of a settlor in a trust he created were reachable by the settlor's
bankruptcy creditors.76 Phillips created a trust in 1996 to hold certain
real estate that he owned. The trust gave Phillips the income for life
and a general testamentary power to appoint the trust property to
anyone he chose, including his personal estate or his creditors." The
trust did not give Phillips any power to appoint the corpus during his
lifetime. Specific remaindermen were named in the event Phillips did
not exercise the power of appointment. The trust also contained a
spendthrift clause. Phillips filed for bankruptcy in 2007, and the
bankruptcy trustee claimed the trust property as property of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.7 ' The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Georgia included Phillips' interest in the trust in his
bankruptcy estate, but on appeal, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia concluded that there was no determinative precedent on this issue under Georgia law. The district court
certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the question of whether a settlor
was the sole beneficiary of a trust that contained provisions like those
in the Phillips trust.79

53, ch. 12 (Supp. 2010)).
73. O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12. See Part II(B) infra for a description of the Revised Georgia
Trust Code of 2010.
74. See O.C.GA § 53-12-80(f) (Supp. 2010).
75. 286 Ga. 619, 690 S.E.2d 620 (2010).
76. Id. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621.
77. Id. A power of appointment in a trust is the power to choose who will receive trust
property. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1290 (9th ed. 2009). See RADFORD, supra note 2, at
§ 15.1 for a discussion of powers of appointment. Under tax law, a power of appointment
is "general" if the person holding the power can appoint the property to anyone, without
limitation, including herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her estate. I.R.C.
§ 2041 (2006). A power is "testamentary" if it can only be exercised by the holder of the
power through a designation in that individual's will. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290
(9th ed. 2009). Thus, the holder of a general testamentary power of appointment could not
appoint the property to herself during her lifetime, but she could appoint the property to
her estate or the creditors of her estate. Phillips, 286 Ga. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621.
78. Phillips,286 Ga. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621. The federal Bankruptcy Code provides
that a beneficiary's interest in a trust is includable in the bankruptcy estate of the debtor
unless there is a restriction on the transfer of that interest that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 541(cX2) (2006).
79. Phillips, 286 Ga. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621. The question the district court asked
the Georgia Supreme Court to answer was as follows:
Whether a settlor of a trust is a sole beneficiary, such that creditors may reach the
corpus of the trust, when the trust instrument gives the settlor no right to the
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The supreme court noted that a settlor could not protect his own
assets from his creditors by putting them into a trust of which he is the
sole beneficiary and then trying to shield them with a spendthrift
clause."e The court determined that even though the trust contained
contingent remainder beneficiaries, the trust would pay all of its income
to Phillips during his life, and the general power of appointment would
allow Phillips to appoint the trust property to his own estate.8
According to the majority, this combination of powers rendered him the
Chief Justice Hunstein dissented,
sole beneficiary of the trust.'
stating that the power of appointment was testamentary only and
therefore did not allow Phillips any access to the trust during his
lifetime.' Thus, the Chief Justice's response to the district court would
have been that Phillips was not the sole trust beneficiary."
The ultimate result in this case was that Phillips could not shield his
trust interests from his creditors when he had access to the income from
the trust property during his life and could appoint it to his estate at
death. But while this result may have been justified, the wording of the
certified question was unfortunate. The district court asked the supreme
court to state that Phillips was the sole beneficiary, which the supreme
court ultimately did.' However, this conclusion flies in the face of the
wording of the trust, which named contingent remainder beneficiaries.6
It is difficult to believe that the supreme court meant to say that
contingent beneficiaries in such trusts have no right to enforce the trust
terms or that the trustee owes them no fiduciary duties.
II. 2010 GEORGIA LEGISLATION
Two significant pieces of legislation were enacted in 2010 by the
Georgia General Assembly. The first was necessitated by the unanticipated repeal of the federal estate tax. The second was a comprehensive
revision of the Georgia Trust Act.87

corpus during his lifetime but provides him with a general power to appoint the
trust corpus as he sees fit in his will and names specific beneficiaries to receive
the corpus of the trust in the event that the settlor does not exercise his power of
appointment?
Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 620, 690 S.E.2d at 622.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 621, 690 S.E.2d at 622 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 620, 690 S.E.2d at 622 (majority opinion).
Id. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621.
O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12 (1997 & Supp. 2010).
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Estate Tax Bill

Since 1916 the United States federal government has imposed a tax
on the gratuitous transfer of property at death." The Revenue Act of
1916 created an estate tax," and later additions to the Internal
Revenue Code created a generation-skipping transfer tax." These
taxes have undergone significant reformation by Congress, with the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)9 ' being the most recent amendment.' The tax is levied on the
decedent's gross estate minus certain deductions." A commonly used
deduction, referred to as the marital deduction, is allowed for property
that is transferred to the decedent's surviving spouse." Not every
estate is taxable because federal law has always excluded estates of a
certain value from the tax.'
After the enactment of EGTRRA, the applicable exclusion amount in
2001 was $1 million, and it increased gradually so that by 2009 estates
valued at $3.5 million and under were not subject to the estate or
However, EGTRRA contained another
generation-skipping taxes.'
significant provision: in the year 2010, the estate tax and generationskipping tax were repealed so that no estates would be subject to the
tax." An additional complication is that the taxes will be reinstated
in 2011 "as if [EGTRRA] had never been enacted."' The prospect of a
one-year repeal of these transfer taxes was so bizarre that most

88. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777; see also Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV.
187, 189 n.7 (2002).
89. 39 Stat. at 777. The estate tax is a tax on the value of the property that is in a
decedent's estate and is transferred to others by will, intestacy, or other methods. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1595 (9th ed. 2009).
90. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2664 (2006). The generation-skipping transfer tax is levied when
property is transferred to an individual who is more than one generation below the
transferor (for example, a transfer from a grandmother to her grandson). See BIACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1595 (9th ed. 2009).
91. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
92. See id.
93. I.R.C. § 2051 (2006). The decedent's gross estate is comprised of all the decedent's
property "real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." I.R.C. § 2031(a)
(2006).
94. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006).
95. See generally I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006).
96. See id.
97. EGTRRA § 501.
98. EGTRRA § 901.

376

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

practitioners assumed Congress would act prior to December 31, 2009,
to either extend the 2009 exclusion amount or otherwise deal with this
impending logistical nightmare.9
But Congress did not act, so on
December 31, 2009, the estate and generation-skipping taxes were
repealed with the knowledge that they would be reinstated on January
1, 2011, in their pre-2001 form."o
Congress's inaction not only threw the estate-planning bar into a state
of utter confusion, but also resulted in a practical problem that few had
anticipated because they had simply not expected the repeal to occur.
This problem was caused by the wording that was used in many wills for
decedents whose estates were large enough that the estate tax or
generation-skipping tax was a realistic possibility. The drafters of these
clients' wills frequently utilized formulas that would split the estate into
portions that would maximize the estate's ability to take advantage of
both the applicable exclusion amount and deductions such as the marital
deduction.'o" An example would be a clause that would give the
spouse the maximum amount the spouse could receive without incurring
a federal estate tax on the estate." Simplistically, for a $5 million
estate in 2009, the formula would result in the spouse receiving $1.5
million. When this amount is deducted from the total value of the
estate, the remaining $3.5 million is not taxed because it does not exceed
the allowable exclusion. The problem that arose in 2010 is that these
formulas became meaningless because they all are dependent upon the
notion that an estate tax is in place.1os
In response to this problem, the Fiduciary Law Section of the State
Bar of Georgia, under the leadership of President Nickola Djuric, asked
the legislature to consider a bill that provides the following: for the wills
of decedents who die during 2010, the various terms used in the wills
that assume the existence of the estate and generation-skipping transfer
tax-terms such as "federal estate tax," "marital deduction," and "gross
estate"-are deemed to refer to the federal tax law that was in effect on
December 31, 2009.'0 The bill also provides that any reference to

99. See, e.g., RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE To ESTATE PLANNING 5-35 to
5-36 (2010 ed. 2009).
100. Id. at 5-36.
101. See id. at 6-47.
102. See id. at 6-47 to 6-48.
103. See id. at 6-47.

104. See Letters from Adam R. Gaslewitz, Chair, Fiduciary Law Section of the State
Bar of Georgia, to Matt Patton, Chairman, ACL (Sept. 12,2007), availableat http//www.gabar.org/public/pdf/sections/fiduciarylaw/trustcodeproposalSeptl207.pdf; Ga. S. Bill 461,
Reg. Seass., 2010 Ga. Laws 493 (codified at O.C.GA § 53-4-75 (Supp. 2010)). The bill
enumerated the following terms:
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amounts that are exempt from or can pass free of the estate tax or the
generation-skipping tax will be deemed to refer to amounts that were
exempt under the federal law as of December 31, 2009." The General
This new
Assembly enacted this legislation on May 27, 2010.10
legislation07 added O.C.G.A. § 53-4-75'0 to the Georgia Probate
Code.'0o
Georgia Tust Code
During the 2010 session, the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive revision to Georgia's Trust Act, the Revised Georgia Trust Code of
2010,"1o which appears in chapter 12 of title 53 of the O.C.G.A."'
The revision was proposed by the Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar
of Georgia and was the product of that section's Trust Code Revision
The instigation for the revision of the
Committee (Committee)."
Georgia Trust Act, which had been codified in 1991," was the promulgation in 2000 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)' by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws s-now the
Uniform Law Commissioners." 6 The Committee examined the existing
Georgia law and studied what changes should be recommended in light
of the UTC and developments in other state laws. An extensive
discussion of the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010 (Revised Code) is
beyond the scope of this Article.

B.

federal estate tax, gross estate, unified credit, estate tax exemption, applicable
exemption amount, applicable credit amount, deduction, charitable deduction,
value for federal estate tax purposes, federal generation-skipping transfer tax,
generation-skipping transfer, applicable exclusion amount, generation-skipping
transfer tax exemption, GST exemption, skip person, direct skip, transferor,
marital deduction, maximum marital deduction, unlimited marital deduction.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 2-3, 2010 Ga. Laws at 493.
107. See Ga. S. Bill 461 at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at § 1.
108. O.C.G.A. § 534-75 (Supp. 2010).
109. O.C.G.A. tit. 53 (2007 & Supp. 2010).
110. Ga. S. Bill 131, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 1506 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch.
12 (Supp. 2010)).
111. See id.
112. Letter from Adam R. Gaslowitz, supra note 104.
113. Ga. R. Bill 794, Reg. Sess., 1991 Ga. Laws 390.
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2005), availableat http//www.law.upenn.edu/bil/archives/ulc/uta/2005final.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Unif. Law Comm'n, Home Page, UNIF. IAW COMM'N: THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIP. STATE LAWS, http-//www.nceusl.org/Update/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
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The following is a brief outline of some of the major provisions of the
Revised Code.
1. The Revised Code addresses the creation and validity of trusts in
the following ways:
a) Includes a statute that clarifies which state's laws apply in decisions relating to the validity of a trust and the meaning and effect of
trust terms;117
b) Adds a provision that allows an agent under a power of attorney
to create a trust for the principal if the power of attorney expressly
authorizes the agent to do so;...
c) Clarifies that a transfer of legal title of property must be made to
the trustee in order for property to become trust property;" 9
d) Adds a definition of "qualified beneficiary 20 and later provides
that these beneficiaries are qualified to notice in more circumstances
than contingent beneficiaries;' 2 1
e) Allows a settlor to create a trust for animals (for example,
pets);122 and
f) Clarifies that "No trust shall be considered to be revocable
merely because the life beneficiary has a reversion in or a power of
appointment over assets of the trust or because the life beneficiary's
heirs or estate have a remainder interest therein."'
2. The Revised Code addresses modification and termination of trusts
in the following ways:
a) Allows for the reformation of a trust by a court to correct mistakes;12

117. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-5 (Supp. 2010). The Revised Code also contains a jurisdictional
provision at O.C.GA § 53-12-6 (Supp. 2010).
118. O.C.GA § 53-12-20(a) (Supp. 2010).
119. O.C.GA § 53-12-25(a) (Supp. 2010).
120. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(10) (Supp. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
beneficiary is a qualified beneficiary if the beneficiary
(A) Is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; (B)
Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the
interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph
terminated on that date without causing the trust to terminate; or (C) Would be
a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust
terminated on that date.
Id.
121. See, e.g., O.C.GA § 53-12-242(a) (Supp. 2010) (notice as to existence of a trust).
122. O.C.GA § 53-12-28(a) (Supp. 2010).
123. O.C.GA § 53-12-44 (Supp. 2010).
124. O.C.GA § 53-12-60(a) (Supp. 2010).
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b) Adds more detailed provisions relating to the modification of
administrative and dispositive terms of a trust by a court;'"
c) Clarifies when a settlor's agent or conservator can modify a
revocable trust;" and
d) Adds a provision for the termination of uneconomic trusts, which
are trusts of less than $50,000 of which the trustee's fee is 5% or
more.12
3. The Revised Code addresses revocable trusts, spendthrift trusts,
and creditors' rights in the following ways:
a) Adds provisions that explain creditors' rights against the interest
of a settlor in a revocable or irrevocable trust, both during the settlor's
life and at the settlor's death;i" and
b) Retains current Georgia spendthrift trust law and adds persons
who hold judgments or orders for restitution as a result of a crime
committed by the beneficiary to the list of creditors who can reach a
beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust."
4. The Revised Code addresses notification of the existence of a trust
by requiring that "[wlithin 60 days after the date of creation of an
irrevocable trust or of the date on which a revocable trust becomes
irrevocable, the trustee .. . notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trust
of the existence of the trust and the name and mailing address of the
trustee.""o This requirement can be waived by the settlor of the trust,
and "[alll irrevocable trusts in existence on [the effective date of the
Revised Code] shall be deemed to have waived this [requirement]."'a'

125. O.C.GA § 53-12-62 (Supp. 2010).
126. O.C.GA § 53-12-43 (Supp. 2010). An agent may exercise this power only if both
the trust instrument and the instrument creating the power of attorney authorize the
agent to do so. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-43(a). In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 29-5-23 (2007), a
conservator may do so only if authorized by the court that has jurisdiction over the
conservatorship. O.C.GA I 53-12-43(b).
127. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-65(a) (Supp. 2010). This provision does not apply to a trust when
the sole purpose of the trust is to use the trust property to care for a cemetery plot. Id.
128. O.C.GA J 53-12-82 (Supp. 2010).
129. O.C.GA § 53-12-80 (Supp. 2010).
130. O.C.GA § 53-12-242(a). See supra note 118, for a definition of qualified
beneficiaries.
131. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-242(b) (Supp. 2010). See O.C.GA § 53-12-7 (Supp. 2010) for the
list of provisions that may not be varied by the settlor in the trust instrument. The notice
requirement of O.C.G.A. § 53-12-242 (Supp. 2010) is not on this list, which indicates that
it may be waived by the settlor.
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5. The Revised Code addresses statutes of limitations in the following
ways:
a) Provides that "[alny judicial proceeding to contest the validity of
a trust that was revocable immediately before the settlor's death shall
be commenced within two years of the settlor's death"; and
b) Changes the statute of limitations for bringing actions for breach
of trust to two years from the date "a beneficiary has received a
written report that adequately discloses the existence of a claim
against the trustee for a breach of trust."" However, in all other
cases the current statute of limitations, which is "six years after the
beneficiary discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the
subject of [the] claim," stays in place.'
6. The Revised Code changes the trustee compensation statute to
provide the following trustee compensation in the event no compensation
is spelled out in the trust instrument or in an agreement between the
settlor and the trustee or the beneficiary and the trustee:
a) With respect to a corporate trustee, its published fee schedule will
be its compensation, provided such fees are reasonable under the
circumstances;'a and
b) For individual trustees, the compensation schedule combines 1%
of the value of the trust property upon initial funding of the trust and
an annual fee progressively decreasing from 1.75% to .50% of the
value of the trust assets per year, with the lower percentages applying
to the larger trusts. 3 6
7. With respect to powers of trustees, the Revised Code provides that
a trustee automatically has a broad range of powers to deal with trust
property unless the settlor limits those powers.'
8. With respect to trust certification, the Revised Code allows a
trustee to give a certification of trust rather than the entire trust
document to all who request to see the trust, except that trust beneficiaries must be given the entire document."a
132. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-45(a) (Supp. 2010). This statute of limitations did not appear in
the former Georgia Trust Act. See O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12 (1997) (current version at
O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12 (Supp. 2010)).
133. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-307(a) (Supp. 2010).
134. Id.
135. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-210(c)(1) (Supp. 2010).
136. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-210(c)(2) (Supp. 2010).
137. See O.C.GA § 53-12-261 (Supp. 2010).
138. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-280 (Supp. 2010).
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9. The Revised Code addresses investment of trust assets in the
following ways:
a) Adds a provision that describes the trustee's duties in relation to
managing the risk of concentrated holdings;'39 and
b) Replaces the Georgia Principal and Income Act'u with the
Uniform Principal and Income Act's 41 most recent version.14 1

139. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-341 (Supp. 2010).
140. O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12, art. 17 (Supp. 2010).
141.

UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (1997).

142. Compare UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, with O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12, art. 17.
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